Abstract: This paper uncovers the Phillips curve trade-off perceived by U.S. monetary policymakers. For that purpose we use data on individual forecasts for unemployment and inflation submitted by each individual FOMC member, which was recently made available for the period 1992-1998. The results point to significant changes in the perceived trade-off over time with the Phillips curve flattening and the implied NAIRU falling towards the second half of the sample. Hence, the results suggest that policymakers were aware of these changes in real-time. We also find interesting differences between Federal Reserve governors and the presidents of the regional Reserve Banks as well as between voting and non-voting presidents.
Introduction
For central bankers, understanding the short-run trade-off between real economy activity and inflation, also known as the Phillips curve trade-off, is of paramount importance. It is now well known that the Phillips curve flattened since the beginning of the 1980s, a stylized fact first noted by Atkeson and Ohanian (2001) . The period of sustained growth in the second half of the 1990s in the absence of inflationary pressure is widely believed to reflect a further significant structural change in the underlying trade-off. Due to favorable productivity shocks, the argument goes, the Non-Accelerating Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU) fell. When did policymakers notice this change? 2 This question is difficult to address based on aggregate macroeconomic data, let alone ex-post revised data. Researchers typically focus on verbal transcripts to illustrate how uncertainty about the Phillips curve affected Federal Reserve decision making. Meade and Thornton (2009) , for example, study the debate within the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) about the Phillips curve in the 1990s. They document that the FOMC transcripts contain a dramatic increase in references to keywords such as "potential output", "Phillips curve", and "NAIRU" towards the second half of the 1990s. They also list examples of FOMC members expressing doubt about the reliability of the Phillips curve as a guideline for interest rate policy. An alternative approach is offered by Ball and Tchaidze (2002) . They show that a standard Taylor rule can replicate interest rate setting during the late 1990s only once a falling NAIRU is taken into account. In the 1990s, the Federal Reserve Board's main macroeconometric model, FRB/US, underwent various changes. Tetlow and Ironside (2007) document 30 model vintages. They show that the changing model properties are consistent with a falling NAIRU and a flatter Phillips curve. This paper addresses these potential changes in the unemployment-inflation nexus and elicits the perception of the Phillips curve trade-off implicit in forecasts of inflation and unemployment of each individual member of the FOMC. Instead of relying on aggregate data or verbal statements, this paper infers the real-time beliefs about this issue directly from policymakers' quantitative forecasts. For this purpose, we employ 2 This uncertainty about the Phillips curve relation let research such as Gorodnichenko and Shapiro (2007) refer to monetary policy as the "growth gamble" of the Fed in the second half of the 1990s. For a survey on the emergence of the New Economy and the response of monetary policy see Wynne (2002) . a data set on individual forecasts, that is, forecasts for inflation and unemployment of each individual FOMC member, which was recently made available in Romer (2009) . By submitting these forecast twice a year, each FOMC member is forced to reveal his notion of the trade-off between real activity and inflation. The data set covers the period 1992-1998, which is the period of heightened uncertainty about the usefulness of the Phillips curve. We estimate a perceived Phillips curve trade-off based on the real-time output gap as a driving variable and, alternatively, with unemployment as the measure of real activity. The former specification allows us to infer changes in the perceived slope or, respectively, the perceived sacrifice ratio, over time. The latter specification can be used to elicit the NAIRU implied by each member's combination of unemployment and inflation forecasts The results point to significant changes in the slope of the perceived Phillips curve over time with the Phillips curve flattening towards the second half of the sample. While individual forecasts reflect a positively sloped Phillips curve in the early 1990s, there appears to be no significant relation between inflation and the output gap towards the end of the sample. The estimates also suggest that the NAIRU fell over time from about 6.9% in 1992-1994 to 5.3% after 1996. Hence, we conclude that the FOMC forecasts are consistent with the notion that the Phillips curve changed during the second half of the 1990s and that, on average, FOMC members took that into account when submitting their forecasts. This paper is organized as follows. Section two introduces FOMC forecasts and presents the data set. Section three contains the empirical approach and discusses the results. Section four draws some tentative conclusions.
FOMC forecasts
Twice a year at its February and July meetings the FOMC publishes the monetary policy report to congress (Humphrey-Hawkins report). It contains forecasts of, among other variables, unemployment and the inflation rate. Each FOMC member submits her own forecasts, after intensive briefing by the Board staff. The staff publishes its own set of forecasts in the Greenbook, which is continuously available to FOMC members. Until recently, however, individual forecasts were kept secret. The published report only contains a range of forecasts and the midpoint of this range, also known as the central tendency. These data received some attention in recent years. Gavin (2003) evaluates the information content of the central tendency and the FOMC's forecasting record, while Gavin and Mandal (2003) compare forecast accuracy between the FOMC, the private sector, and the staff. Likewise, Romer and Romer (2008) contrast FOMC forecasts with Federal Reserve staff forecasts. They provokingly argue that the FOMC forecasts do not contain useful information beyond that already incorporated in staff forecasts. Differences between FOMC and staff forecasts are shown to predict monetary shocks. Gavin and Pande (2008) use data from the survey of professional forecasters to mimic the FOMC's forecasting method and analyse the different measures of forecast consensus. Recently, the Fed makes data on individual FOMC forecasts available for selected years. Based on these releases, Romer (2009) constructs a data set containing forecasts for the period 1992-1998. With this publication, the interest in FOMC forecasting is most likely to be revived. The present paper is the first attempt to use this data set. 3 We use this data set to uncover policymakers' beliefs about the Phillips curve trade-off. By setting a forecast of unemployment and inflation, each FOMC member implicitly reveals her perception of the short-run trade-off between these two variables. The data set contains forecasts from board members as well as from voting and non-voting regional Federal Reserve Bank presidents. It does not, however, contain forecasts from the chairman. Of course the short sample period available to the researcher is a serious restriction. Fortunately, however, it does at least cover a very interesting episode of U.S. monetary policy as this time span reflects the period of policymakers' heightened uncertainty about possible changes in the trade-off due to favorable shift in productivity. In the July report, the FOMC prepares forecasts for the following calender year (this forecast will be indexed by | + 18 hereafter) and the current calender year (indexed by | + 6). The February report contains forecasts for the current calender year ( |+12). The inflation forecast is the expected forth-quarter-to-fourth-quarter change of the CPI, while the unemployment forecast refers to the rate of unemployment in the last quarter of the year. The forecasts are supposed to be conditional on each member's own judgement of the "appropriate policy" path over the forecast horizon. For each of the three different forecasts per year, i.e. one at the February meeting and two at the July meeting, the data set contains forecasts for inflation and the unemployment rate for seven years and 18 FOMC members. Since a couple of FOMC seats were vacant in the sample period, this leaves us with 120 pairs of observations for each forecast horizon. We use these individual FOMC forecasts to address the following questions. First, how do FOMC members perceive the trade-off between the output gap and inflation? Put differently, is there a systematic relationship between their inflation forecast and the last observation on the output gap prior to submitting the inflation forecast? Second, how does the perceived slope of the Phillips curve change over time? Third, what is the NAIRU implied by the combined forecasts for inflation and unemployment. Note that this paper does not evaluate issues of forecast accuracy or forecast rationality. Throughout the exercise we maintain the assumption that strategic motives in forecasting were absent.
Empirical evidence
We proceed in two steps. In the first step, the inflation forecast is related to past inflation and the output gap in order to infer the slope of the Phillips curve that is consistent with each member's forecast. In a second step, the inflation forecast is related to the unemployment forecast. This allows us to extract the NAIRU implied by each individual set of forecasts.
The Phillips curve as implied by FOMC forecasts
The reduced form specification used in this section relates the February or, alternatively, the July inflation forecast,    |+12 or   |+6 , both of which are for the current calender year, to the last observations on inflation and the output gap available at each FOMC meeting. For the February forecast, the model is
while the specification for the July forecast is given by
A similar specification is used frequently in the literature, e.g. Clark and McCracken (2006) . All forecasts are denoted by superscript  . The most recent year-on-year inflation figure available to the policymaker at the time of the meeting is denoted by   |−12 and  |−12 . The latest output gap available at the meeting, i.e. the gap over the proceeding quarter, is   |−3 or  |−3 . We also include a constant  0 . Data on inflation is taken from the FRED database at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The output gap, i.e. the percentage deviation of output from potential, is taken from the Fed's Greenbook. Hence, it corresponds to the real-time data the FOMC members had at hand when formulating forecasts. This data comes from the real-time database at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. A positive  1 implies that a positive output gap (output above its potential level) at the time of the meeting leads FOMC members to raise their forecast of inflation relative to inflation observed at the date of the meeting. To the extent the decision makers lose faith in the Phillips curve relationship, the coefficient  1 will fall over time.
The results are presented in table (1) . In almost all specifications, the slope coefficient is significantly positive. Moreover, the Phillips curve flattens over time. Take the February forecasts as an example. In the early years of the sample, i.e. 1992-1994, the slope is  1 = 021. This coefficient falls to 014 in the 1995-1998 subsample. Note that this turns out to be a significantly lower slope coefficient. When forecasts from the February and the July meetings are included jointly, the drop in the implied slope coefficient becomes even more pronounced. It falls from 013 in 1992-1994 to 005 in 1995-1998. This is a key result of this paper. The Phillips curve that is consistent with each member's submitted inflation forecasts flattens in the second half of the 1990s. The parameter  1 could also be interpreted as the inverse of the perceived sacrifice ratio, that is, the cost of reducing inflation in terms of foregone output gap. This view takes account of the fact that we work only with a reduced form empirical model that lacks a clear structural interpretation. Furthermore, this allows us to interpret the different estimates for alternative forecasting horizons. The estimates here imply that the sacrifice ratio increased towards the end of the 1990s. Not surprisingly, the share of variation explained by this simple model is rather low. The  2 falls to even lower levels in the later years of the sample. This also indicates that the relationship that explains the link between the output gap and the inflation forecast in the early years is no longer able account for the variation of inflation 
The NAIRU as implied by FOMC forecasts
The aim of this section is to uncover the perception of the NAIRU implied by each member's forecast of inflation and the unemployment rate. For that purpose, we again estimate a simple accelerationist Phillips curve regression. In contrast to the previous section, we include the unemployment forecast as the real driving variable.
The forecast made at each July meeting for the calender year following the meeting,   |+18 , is regressed on the July forecast for the current calender year,   |+6 , and the forecast for unemployment, also for the current calender year,   |+6
Note that all three forecasts entering this equation are formulated at the same FOMC meeting. Based on the parameter estimates we can derive a rough implied estimate of the NAIRU   , which is determined by
As an alternative specification, we also estimate this regression with the unemployment forecast for the following calender year, i.e.   |+18
We are interested in how   evolves over time. It is well known that the equilibrium rate of unemployment fell over the second half of the 1990s, see Staiger, Stock, and Watson (2001). It is not clear, however, whether and when FOMC members, probably apart from chairman Greenspan, perceived this fall of the NAIRU in real-time.
A first impression can be obtained from a scatter plot of the unemployment forecast against the change in the inflation forecast, see figure (1 instead of   |+18 , are shown in table (4) and suggest very similar conclusions. For all NAIRU estimates the  2 increases remarkably over time pointing to the fact that the dispersion of forecasts around the average or consensus NAIRU is more and more reduced. Although we do not want to stress the evidence based on seven years of data too far it seems fair to say that the dispersion of beliefs about the short-run trade off converged somewhat over time. The group of regional Fed presidents can further be separated into presidents with the right to vote on interest rate policy and those without. . We find interesting differences across these subgroups. Voting presidents base their forecast on a NAIRU that is very close to the one perceived by Fed governors, while non-voting presidents perceive a NAIRU that is more than one percentage point higher. 4 Take the estimates based on the six-months ahead unemployment forecast. While the forecasts submitted by voting presidents are consistent with a NAIRU of 5.8, the forecasts of non-voting presidents are consistent with a NAIRU of 7.4. At the same time, governors perceive a NAIRU of 6.0, see table (3) . This finding is consistent with recent results obtained by Meade (2005) . She analyzes FOMC transcripts and finds that non-voters are more likely to disagree with the chairman's interest rate proposal than voters. Here we show that voters' perception of the NAIRU are much closer to board members'. If board members' perceptions reflect those of the chairman, voting presidents have indeed fewer reasons for dissent.
Conclusions
This paper investigates how monetary policymakers think about the short-run tradeoff between real activity and inflation, i.e. the Phillips curve. For this purpose, forecasts for unemployment and inflation from each individual FOMC member over the period 1992-1998 are used, which became available recently. When submitting their forecasts, FOMC members appear to have implicitly revealed a significant trade-off. The slope of the Phillips curve, however, is shown to change over time. Inflation forecasts respond less to incoming output gap figures towards the second half of the sample. Alternatively, the joint forecast for inflation and unemployment is consistent with the perception of a falling NAIRU in the post-1995 subsample. The results, therefore, suggest that FOMC members took these changes in the short-run trade-off into account. In their assessment of the Greenspan era, Blinder and Reis (2005, p. 51) discuss the FOMC's information about the changing trend in productivity and ask "What did Greenspan see that others failed to see?". Here we show that other FOMC members shared his view. The present paper is a first step to exploit individual FOMC forecasts in order to extract policymakers' beliefs about unemployment and inflation. Recent papers by Capistrán (2008) 
